ABSTRACTOther people’s emotional reactions to a third person’s behaviour are potentially informative about what is appropriate within a given situation. We investigated whether and how observers’ inferences of such injunctive norms are shaped by expressions of anger and disgust. Building on the moral emotions literature, we hypothesised that angry and disgusted expressions produce relative differences in the strength of autonomy-based versus purity-based norm inferences. We report three studies using different types of stimuli to investigate how emotional reactions shape norms about (...) potential norm violations, and contexts. Consistent with our theoretical argument, the results indicate that observers use others’ emotional reactions not only to infer whether a particular behaviour is inappropriate, but also why it is inappropriate: because it primarily violates auto... (shrink)

Fowers et al. (2017)recently made a general argument for virtues as the characteristics necessary for individuals to flourish, given inherent human limitations. For example, people can flourish by developing the virtue of friendship as they navigate the inherent (healthy) human dependency on others. This general argument also illuminates a pathway to flourishing during the COVID-19 pandemic, the risks of which have induced powerful fears, exacerbated injustices, and rendered life and death decisions far more common. Contexts of risk and fear call (...) for the virtue of courage. Courage has emerged more powerfully as a central virtue among medical personnel, first responders, and essential workers. Longstanding inequalities have been highlighted during the pandemic, calling for the virtue of justice. When important personal and public health decisions must be made, the central virtue of practical wisdom comes to the fore. Wise decisions and actions incorporate the recognition of relevant moral concerns and aims, as well as responding in fitting and practical ways to the specifics of the situation. Practicing courage, justice, and practical wisdom illuminates a path to flourishing, even in a pandemic. (shrink)

Virtue-based ethics prioritizes _phronesis_ (practical wisdom) because, as rules have become less action-guiding, good judgment (_phronesis_) becomes more necessary as a guiding meta-virtue. The view of _phronesis_ that MacIntyre proposed in _After Virtue_ (hereafter, AV _phronesis_) has been applied in medical ethics despite his substantial deviations from his source (Aristotle) in _After Virtue_. In this paper, we clarify the differences between the neo-Aristotelian and AV _phronesis_ views and argue for a neo-Aristotelian _phronesis_ with four functions (constitutive, adjudicative, emotion regulative, and (...) blueprint). In referring to neo-Aristotelians, we refer to the recent scholars that who hark back strongly to Aristotle and have amended some of Aristotle’s less palatable views by adding insights from current empirical science to the domains that he left vague. Then we discuss how AV _phronesis_ and neo-Aristotelian _phronesis_ differ, focusing on the distinction between technical (i.e., alterable means toward patient health such as medication choices) and _phronetic_ (i.e., actions that are inseparable from patient health) actions in medicine. This distinction is understated in AV _phronesis_, but central to neo-Aristotelian _phronesis_. Accordingly, the neo-Aristotelian approach makes an important and unique contribution to physician ethical development. (shrink)

Dishonesty is prevalent and causes great damage to society. On an individual level, besides reaping rewards, it also carries a psychological cost for those who engage in it. This principle is used to make people more honest with behavioral interventions, one of them being the well-known ‘signature nudge’. Digital transition in society has however led to changes in the way people sign, which may affect the effectiveness of this nudge. In two experiments, the current study investigates the relationship between digital (...) signatures and honesty, building on previous research by examining novel signature types, the moderating role of personal characteristics, effect decay, and the predicting value of digital signature characteristics. Results show no effect of any signature intervention and no unilateral relation between digital signature characteristics and subsequent behavior. These findings contrast with earlier research and cast doubt on the use of signature interventions as a tool to prevent or predict dishonest behavior. (shrink)

Philosophers provide excellent resources for developing a science of virtues, and an interdisciplinary collaboration between philosophers and psychologists seems ideal. This suggestion is not new, but there has been little guidance for psychologists about how philosophical work can be useful in developing a science of virtue. This article provides some guidance by dividing the contributions of philosophers into three categories. First, many philosophers provide theories of virtue’s nature or value, but these are generally not useful for psychological scientists and can (...) be safely ignored. Second, awareness of the range of philosophic positions can enable scientists to recognize contentious theoretical assumptions that they are making. Psychologists need not try to resolve these debates; they can choose to only identify which position(s) they are taking. Third, awareness of the range of philosophic positions and the competing conceptual analyses of various virtue concepts and traits can help psychologists to identify and test new empirical hypotheses. (shrink)

In the current paper we present an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) will refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals. We demonstrate that different goals can lead to differences in the use of deception (Experiment 1). Furthermore, we demonstrate that reactions to deceit can also be understood from an instrumental perspective (Experiment 2).

Reverend H.F.C. Logan is put forward as the formerly unidentified figure to which Robert Leslie Ellis referred in a journal entry of 1840 in which he wrote that it was due to his influence that William Whewell came to uphold particular Kantian views on time and space. The historical evidence of Ellis’s early familiarity with, and later commitment to Kant is noteworthy for at least two reasons. Firstly, it puts into doubt the accepted view of the second generation of reformers (...) of British algebra as non-philosophical, practice-oriented mathematicians. Secondly, in so far as Logan was the correspondent of William Rowan Hamilton, it re-emphasizes that the role of Kantianism in the transition from ‘symbolical’ to ‘abstract’ algebra in nineteenth-century British algebra requires closer scrutiny. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper provides a detailed account of the period of the complex history of British algebra and geometry between the publication of George Peacock's Treatise on Algebra in 1830 and William Rowan Hamilton's paper on quaternions of 1843. During these years, Duncan Farquharson Gregory and William Walton published several contributions on ‘algebraical geometry’ and ‘geometrical algebra’ in the Cambridge Mathematical Journal. These contributions enabled them not only to generalize Peacock's symbolical algebra on the basis of geometrical considerations, but also to (...) initiate the attempts to question the status of Euclidean space as the arbiter of valid geometrical interpretations. At the same time, Gregory and Walton were bound by the limits of symbolical algebra that they themselves made explicit; their work was not and could not be the ‘abstract algebra’ and ‘abstract geometry’ of figures such as Hamilton and Cayley. The central argument of the paper is that an understanding of the contributions to ‘algebraical geometry’ and ‘geometrical algebra’ of the second generation of ‘scientific’ symbolical algebraists is essential for a satisfactory explanation of the radical transition from symbolical to abstract algebra that took place in British mathematics in the 1830s–1840s. (shrink)

One of the key concepts in modern science is force (F). In present studies on the history of dynamics, Patricius is either completely omitted or only cursorily mentioned. The aim of this text is to show that Patricius’s concept of the soul, as he developed it in his Nova de universis philosophia from 1591, comes close to the modern (i.e. Newtonian) understanding of force. This should support the more general position that one of the most intriguing aspects of Patricius’s philosophy (...) is his contribution to the emergence of modern science. (shrink)

The so-called „Covering Law Model“ of explanation proposed by C. Hempel and R. Oppenheim was claimed to have been applied as an explanatory model in natural sciences as well as in humanities. Several objections were raised against this explanatory model during the second half of 20th century. This article considers the proposed criteria of adequacy of scientific explanation and, in particular, the possibilities and limitations connected with the idea of its applicability in the process of logical reconstruction of historical explanations. (...) In the final part of the paper I introduce some remarks concerning the „methodological“ relation of dependence between the explanandum and the explanans which could also illuminate the proper role of this explanatory model in history. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the problem of identification of laws of nature and their demarcation from other kinds of regularities. The problem is approached from the viewpoint of several metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological criteria. Firstly, several dominant approaches to the problem are introduced. Secondly, the logical and semantic explicatory framework – Transparent Intensional Logic – is presented for the sake of clarification of logical forms of sentences that are supposed to express the laws of nature. Finally, a complementary strategy (...) to the demarcation problem is proposed, including reconsideration of relevant metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological requirements and principles behind the former conceptions. (shrink)

The paper presents a two-level approach to an assessment of meaning theories. To begin with, language is distinguished from lan guage-model and, analogously, meaning is discerned from a model of meaning. The first level of a theory assessment is presented as dealing with the relation of a model of meaning to intra-theoretical aims and assumptions of a theory with specific language-model. The second level of assessment concerns ontological, epistemological, logical and other assumptions underlying the respective language-model. Finally, several questions are (...) set forth as methodological directives for elucidating hidden assumptions behind the theories of meaning. (shrink)

The paper presents the logical milieu of the Paradox of ravens, identified by Hempel in his Studies in the Logic of Confirmation. It deals with Hempel’s interpretations of Nicod’s criterion of confirmation as well as with its inadmissible consequences. I, subsequently, suggest an epistemological and semantic specification of empirical properties, i.e., of their identity; then I formulate a criterion of the test of properties expressed by empirical hypothesis. Finally, I propose a procedural conception of confirmation by means of the testing (...) procedure schema. The confirmation is, therefore, conceived as an attribute which can be ascribed to a hypothesis through the process of its testing. The methods of testing are central to the hypothesis’s qualifica-tion as confirmed. (shrink)

Carnap’s analysis of the language of science had presupposed too close a connection between the semantics and testability. The core problem of the logical empiricist tradition was to show how to provide the interpretation of theoretical terms and hence the explanation of their application to observable entities by means of observation terms. It is argued that the utilization of a much more expressive semantic theory which identifies meanings with hyperintensional entities leads to a clarification of the competencies of semantics and (...) methodology. It is claimed that the observability or unobservability of term’s referents does not determine the meaning of the term. Carnap’s reduction sentences are therefore conceived only as methodological devices for the determination of unobservables via the theory-presupposed observable aspects. (shrink)

This review article explores in a critical spirit the differences between constituent and relational ontology as practiced by four contemporary Aristotelian philosophers, Michael J. Loux, E. J. Lowe, Lukáš Novák, and Stanislav Sousedík.

Reedition of papers in English spanning from 1986 to 2009 /// Historical background -- An imposed legacy -- Twentieth century contemporaneity -- Appendix: The philosophy of teaching legal philosophy in Hungary /// HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -- PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: A SKETCH OF HISTORY [1999] 11–21 // PHILOSOPHISING ON LAW IN THE TURMOIL OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN HUNGARY (TWO PORTRAITS, INTERWAR AND POSTWAR: JULIUS MOÓR & ISTVÁN LOSONCZY) [2001–2002] 23–39: Julius Moór 23 / István Losonczy 29 // (...) ON THE SURVIVAL OF ILMAR TAMMELO’S LETTER AND MANUSCRIPT ADDRESSED TO PROFESSOR MOÓR [2009] 41–44 // PROFESSIONAL DISTRESS AND SCARCITY: ALEXANDER HORVÁTH AND THE LEGACY OF NATURAL LAW IN HUNGARY [2005] 45–50 // HUNGARIAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY [2011] 51–72: I. The Pre-war Period [1. Bódog (Felix) Somló (1871–1920) 52] / II. The Inter-war Period [2. Gyula (Julius) Moór (1888–1950) 54 / 3. Barna Horváth (1896–1973) 55 / 4. József Szabó (1909–1992) 57 / 5. István Bibó (1911–1979) 58 / 6. Tibor Vas (1911–1983) 59 / 7. István Losonczy (1918–1980) 60] III. The Post-war Period (Communism) 61 [8. Imre Szabó (1912–1991) 62 / 9. Vilmos Peschka (1929–2006) 63 / 10. Kálmán Kulcsár (1928–2010) 65] IV. Contemporary Trends and Perspectives 66 [11. Csaba Varga (b. 1941) 66 / 12. András Sajó (b. 1949) 69 / 13. Béla Pokol (b. 1950) 70] V. Our Understanding of the Law Today 71 --- AN IMPOSED LEGACY -- LOOKING BACK [1999] 75–94: 1. On Ideologies and Marxism in general 75 / 2. Life of an Intellectual in Communism 79 / 3. On Marxism and its Socialist Cultivation in Particular 82 / 4. Legal Philosophising [4.1. Approaches to Law 87 / 4.2. Arriving at a Legal Ontology 91] 5. Conclusion 94 // LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARXISM OF SOCIALISM: HUNGARIAN OVERVIEW IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE [2003] 95–151: I. Development and Balance of Marxist Philosophising on Law in Hungary [1. Preliminaries (until 1948) 96 / 2. Stalinism (from the Soviet Occupation on) {a) Liquidation of the »Residues« 98 / b) Soviet-type Uniformisation [Gleichschaltung] 99 / c) Denial of the Past, with a Dual Effect 99 / d) »Socialist Legality«, Drawn from the Progressive Past of Western Europe 103 / e) Search for the Germs of Scholarly Evolution 103} 3. Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation (from the 1960s) [a) Epigonism Becoming the Scholarly Ideal 104 / b) Stalinism in a Critical Self-perspective 105 / c) Disciples Diversified Launching their own Trends 107 / d) Comparatism 110 / e) (Re)discovery of the Western Legal Philosophy as a Competitor 112 / f) A Leading Mediatory Role within the »Socialist World Order« 114} 4. Disintegration (in the 1980s) {a) Attempt at Laying New Foundations for Marxism with Epigonism Exhausted 115 / b) Competitive Trends Becoming Exclusive 115 / c) Western Legal Philosophy Acknowledged as a Fellow-traveller within the Socialist Orbit Proper 116 / d) Hungarian Legal Theory Transforming into a National Corpus 118 / e) The Practical Promotion of Some Balance 119} 5. End-game for a Substitute State Religion (in the 1990s) 120] II. Marxist Legal Philosophising in an International Perspective [Ad 1: To the Preliminaries 122 / Ad 2: To Stalinism 124 / Ad 3: To Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation {a) Late Separation from Vishinskiy’s Theory 125 / b) From Ideological Self-closure to an Apparently Scholarly Openness 127 / c) From Political Ideology to Genuine Scholarship 130 / d) International Recognition of Socialist Jurisprudence as an Independent Trend 135 / e) Together with Western Trends 137} Ad 4: To Disintegration {a) Loss of Attraction as Mere Epigonism 139 / b) Exclusivity of Competing Trends 139 / c) Fellowship with »Bourgeois« Trends 140 / d) An own Trend, Internationally Recognised 141 / e) A yet Progressive Role 142} Ad 5: To the Present state 143] III. A Temporary Balance 145 // AUTONOMY AND INSTRUMENTALITY OF LAW IN A SUPERSTRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE [1986] 151–175: 1. The Strange Fate of Concepts 151 / I. A Relational Category 2. Basis and Superstructure: The Genuine Meaning 154 / 3. Exerting Social Influence as a Conceptual Minimum 156 / 4. Relationships within the Prevailing Totality 158 / 5. Attempts at Interpretation in Hungary 159 / 6. The Lukácsian Stand 162 / 7. Lukács’s Recognitions 168 / 8. Some Criticism 169 / II. The Law’s Understanding 171 / 9. Law Interpreted as Superstructure 171 / 10. Conclusions Drawn for the Law’s Understanding 173 // LEGAL THEORY IN TRANSITION (A PREFACE FROM HUNGARY) [2000] 177–186 // DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL LEGAL THOUGHT IN HUNGARY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM [2006] 187–215: 1. International Environment 188 / 2. The Situation in Hungary 190 / 3. Outlook I: The Historical-comparative Study of Legal Cultures and of the Lawyerly Way of Thinking 203 / 4. Outlook II: The Paradigmatic Enigma of the Transition to Rule of Law 207 / 5. Incongruity in Practice 213 / 6. Perspectives 214 --- TWENTIETH CENTURY CONTEMPORANEITY -- CHANGE OF PARADIGMS IN LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION: CARL SCHMITT AND THE TEMPTATION TO FINALLY REACH A SYNTHESIS [2002] 219–234: 1. Dangers of Intellectualism 219 / 2. Schmitt in Facts 221 / 3. Schmitt and Kelsen 222 / 4. On Bordering Conditions 226 / 5. With Kelsen in Transubstantiation 230 / 6. Polarisation as the Path of Theoretical Development 232 // KELSENIAN DOCUMENTS IN HUNGARY: CHAPTERS ON CONTACTS, INCLUDING THE GENESIS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY [2006] 235–243: 1. Preludes 235 / 2. The Search for Moór’s Bequeath 235 / 3. Moór’s Collegiality 238 / 4. Bibó as a Disciple Translating 241 // THE »HART-PHENOMENON« [2002] 245–267: I. The Hart-miracle 246 [1. The Scene of Britain at the Time 247 / 2. The Personal Career 250 / 3. The Opus’ Career 252 / 4. Verbal Sociologism 255 / 5. Growing into the British Pattern 259] II. The Hart-phenomenon 260 [6. Origination of a Strange Orthodoxy 261 / 7. Mastering Periods of the 20th Century 263 / 8. Raising the Issue of Reception in Hungary 365] // LITERATURE? A SUBSTITUTE FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY? [2007] 269–287: 1. The Enigma of Law and its Study 269 / 2. “Law and Literature” 271 / 3. Varieties of “Law and Literature” 274 / 4. The German Study of Artistic Representations 280 / 5. Some Literary Reconsiderations 285 / 6. Conclusion 287 --- APPENDIX -- THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY [2007] 291–320: I. Why and How to Philosophise in Law? 291 / II. The State of Teaching Legal Philosophy 294 / III. The Philosophy of Teaching Legal Philosophy 296 / IV. Programme at the Catholic University of Hungary 300 [1. Graduate Studies 300 {a) Basic Subjects 301 / b) Facultative Seminars 305 / c) Closing Subjects 309 / d) Written Memoranda and the Thesis 312} 2. Postgraduate Studies 313 / 3. Conclusion 317] V. Perspectives 318 /// Index of Subjects 321 / Index of Normative Materials 328 / Index of Names 329 . (shrink)

Lukács, G. Statt eines Vorworts, ein Brief.--Heller, A. Theorie und Praxis, ihr Verhältnis zu den menschlichen Bedürfnissen.--Vajda, M. Marxismus, Existentialismus, Phänomenologie.--Márkus, G. Der Mensch als gesellschaftliches und bewusstes Naturwesen.--Márkus, M. Hegedüs, A. Gemeinschaft und Individuum.--Heller, A., Vajda, M. Familienform und Kommunismus.--Hegedüs, A. Zur Untersuchung von Alternativen der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung.--Fehér, F. Ist der Roman eine problematische Gattung?

Zuko’s plight illuminates the process of aspiration, including common challenges to the aspirant. As Agnes Callard understands it, aspiration typically involves a “deep change in how one sees and feels and thinks.” And this deep change is often intertwined with a change in what contemporary philosopher Christine Korsgaard calls practical identity, a “description under which you value yourself, . . . under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.” But as Zuko (...) shows, practical identities are complex, sometimes unwieldy, and changes in explicit self-conceptions can take work, time, and perhaps some luck to bring about the deep change one aspires to. Even after he explicitly disavows his past actions, Zuko finds himself reverting to past behaviors, doing things that (on some level) he wishes he would not. These actions frustrate him— “Why am I so bad at being good?”— but they are not mere lapses in judgment. They come naturally and express an identity that Zuko had long embraced and cultivated but is now trying to leave behind. The arc of Zuko’s transformation illustrates the interplay between two dimensions of practical identity. On the one hand, as Korsgaard’s account emphasizes, our explicit self-conceptions and values matter. They guide our actions and shape how we see the world. But Zuko’s struggles suggest that such self-conceptions and aspirations are only part of the story. According to Martin Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world, our practical identity depends more on our existential engagement with the world than on our explicit self-conceptions. And these different dimensions of practical identity do not always align. As William Blattner writes, “Some of the most challenging conflicts in our lives arise when who we are existentially engaged in being stands in tension with who we think of ourselves as being.” Zuko is frustrated because, despite consciously trying to change, his being-in-the-world conflicts with his Korsgaardian practical identity. His world is still shaped (residually) by an identity he wants to shed. The way Zuko’s world and actions continue to be shaped by an identity he is trying to leave behind highlights a key difficulty of transformation. Zuko’s desire to prove his worth to his father and his rage have so thoroughly permeated his being-in-the-world that they are second nature. They shape his orientation toward the world and fuel his firebending. For better and worse, his spontaneous actions do not always fall in step with his conscious commitments. The same skills and dispositions Zuko previously cultivated as central to his identity now lead to unwanted actions and keep him from aspired-to actions. To become good in the way he wants, Zuko must not only cultivate the dispositions that will allow his aspired-to identity to become part and parcel of his being-in-the-world, but he must clear out or modify the residual influence of his past identity and related dispositions and values. -/- . (shrink)

Bioethical Prescriptions collects F.M. Kamm's articles on bioethics -- revised for publication in book form -- which have appeared over the last 25 years and which have made her among the most widely-respected philosophers working in this field.

Der Beschreibung der zeitlichen Entwicklung lebender Systeme kann eine reine Differentialanalyse nicht genügen. In solchen Fällen muss man sich an Stelle der gewöhnlichen Differentialgleichungen der integraldifferentiellen, bezw. der Integralgleichungen bedienen. Zur leichteren Veranschaulichung der mathematischen Darstellung betrachtet Verfasser zuerst diejenigen Systeme, deren innerer Zustand sich durch ein einziges Parameterc bestimmen lässt. Die zeitliche Entwicklung eines leblosen Systems dieser Klasse werde durch die Differentialgleichung $$\frac{{dc}}{{dt}} = kf...$$ dargestellt, wot=Zeit, undk eine Funktion der äusseren Parameterα, Β, γ. ist. Im Falle eines jeden (...) Systems sind die äusseren Parameterα, Β, γ. charakteristische individuelle Funktionen der Zeit. Misst manc am. Zeitpunktt, so lässt sich die Zukunft des Systems vermittelst der Gleichung berechnen, wenn die zukünftigen Werte der äusseren Parameter gegeben sind. Solche Systeme nennt Verfasser nicht-historische Systeme. Im Falle der lebenden Systeme werde die zeitliche Entwicklung durch die Integral-differentialgleichung $$\frac{{dc}}{{dt}} = k_1 f_1 + \mathop \smallint \limits_{t - \lambda }^t k_2 f_2 dt........$$ dargestellt, wof 1 undf 2 Funktionen des Zustandsparametersc, undk 1 undk 2 Funktionen der äusseren Parameter sind. Das Zeitintegral erstreckt sich auf das vergangene Zeitintervalt-λ →t, woλ einen positiven endlichen konstanten Wert besitzt. Diese Systeme nennt Verfasser historische Systeme. Setzt manH für das darin enthaltene Integralglied, so verwandelt sich die Gleichung in: $$\frac{{dc}}{{dt}} = k_1 f_1 + H..........$$ Misst man nunc am Zeitpunktt, so kann man in diesem Fall die Zukunft des Systems ohne Kenntnis des historischen GliedsH nicht berechnen. Das Vorkommen des historischen IntegralgliedsH nennt Verfasser Chronoholismus. Man kann deshalb die historischen Systeme auch chronoholistische Systeme nennen. Die biologische Interpretation dieser Betrachtungsweise wird vom Verfasser diskutiert, und die Gleichung auf Systeme mit erblichen Eigenschaften ausgedehnt. Es werden zuletzt Systeme mit vielen Zustandsparametern in gewissen einfachen Fällen kurz behandelt. L'analyse différentielle ne suffit pas, selon l'avis de de l'auteur, pour la description de l'évolution des systèmes vivants au cours des temps. Il faut utiliser dans ces cas les équations intégro-différentielles ou intégrales. Pour faciliter le traÎtement mathématique, on peut considérer d'abord les systèmes dont l'état intérieur est défini par un seul paramètrec. L'évolution d'un système inanimé de cette classe se laisse décrire par l'équation différentielle $$\frac{{dc}}{{dt}} = k f,...........$$ oùt=temps, etk est une fonction déterminée des paramètres extérieurs α,Β, γ. Si l'on connaÎtc à un temps donnét, l'état du système à un temps futurt′ se laisse prévoir au moyen de l'équation, quand les valeurs des paramètres extérieurs dans l'intervallet → t∼' sont fixées. L'auteur appelle les systèmes de cette classe des systèmes non-historiques. Pour les systèmes vivants, il faut se servir, selon l'avis de l'auteur, des équations intégro-différentielles. Pour les systèmes définis par un seul paramètrec, on peut se servir, par exemple, de l'équation $$\frac{{dc}}{{dt}} = k_1 f_1 + \mathop \smallint \limits_{t - \lambda }^t k_2 f_2 dt........$$ où k1 et k2 sont des fonctions déterminées des paramètres extérieurs. L'intégrale s'étend sur l'intervallet-λ→ t où λ est positif et constant. En indiquant le terme intégral par le symboleH, on peut écrire $$\frac{{dc}}{{dt}} = k_1 f_1 + H..........$$ La connaissance de c à un temps donnét ne laisse pas prévoir l'état du système à un temps futurt′ sans connaissance du terme historiqueH, quand mÊme les paramètres α, Β, γ,..., seraient des fonctions déterminées du temps dans l'intervallet→t′. L'auteur appelle l'existence du terme intégral historiqueH le chronoholisme. On peut appeler les systèmes de cette classe des systèmes historiques ou chronoholistiques. L'interprétation biologique de cette faÇon de traÎter les systèmes vivants est discutée par l'auteur, qui étend l'équation pour le faire représenter aussi les propriétés héréditaires des Êtres vivants. Quelques cas de systèmes dont l'état intérieur est défini par plusieurs paramètres et plusieurs phases sont traités brièvement. (shrink)